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Abstract In April 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposed
a complicated market design—the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP)—for
common adoption by all US wholesale power markets. Versions of the WPMP have
been implemented in New England, New York, the mid-Atlantic states, the Mid-
west, the Southwest, and California. Strong opposition to the WPMP persists among
some industry stakeholders, however, due largely to a perceived lack of adequate
performance testing. This study reports on the model development and open-source
implementation (in Java) of a computational wholesale power market organized in
accordance with core WPMP features and operating over a realistically rendered trans-
mission grid. The traders within this market model are strategic profit-seeking agents
whose learning behaviors are based on data from human-subject experiments. Our
key experimental focus is the complex interplay among structural conditions, market
protocols, and learning behaviors in relation to short-term and longer-term market
performance. Findings for a dynamic 5-node transmission grid test case are presented
for concrete illustration.
This article is an abridged version of Sun and Tesfatsion (2007a).
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1 Introduction
The meltdown in the restructured California wholesale power market in the summer
of 2000 has shown what can happen when a poorly designed market mechanism is
implemented without proper testing. The California crisis is believed to have resulted
in part from strategic behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features
(Borenstein 2002). Following the California crisis, many energy researchers have elo-
quently argued the need to combine structural understanding with economic analysis
of incentives in order to develop wholesale power market designs with good real-world
performance characteristics; see, for example, Amin (2004).
In April 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proposed the Who-
lesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) as a template for all U.S. wholesale power
markets (FERC 2003). As detailed in Wilson (2002), this design entails an integrated
rather than unbundled market form; it recommends the operation of wholesale power
markets by Independent System Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Organi-
zations (RTOs) using locational marginal pricing to price energy by the location of its
injection into or withdrawal from the transmission grid. Versions of this design have
been implemented in New England (ISO-NE), New York (NYISO), the mid-Atlantic
states (PJM), the Midwest (MISO), the Southwest (SPP), and California (CAISO).
Joskow (2006, p. 6) reports that ISO/RTO operated energy regions now include over
50% of the generating capacity in the US; see Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Existing and proposed ISO/RTO-operated U.S. wholesale power markets (Source: FERC,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/rto-map.asp)
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The complexity of the WPMP market design has made it extremely difficult to
undertakeeconomicandphysicalreliabilitystudiesof thedesignusingstandardstatistical
and analytical tools. Strong opposition to the market design thus persists among some
industry stakeholders due in part to a perceived lack of sufficient performance testing.
In recent years, however, powerful new agent-based computational tools have been
developed to analyze this degree of complexity. A variety of commercial agent-based
frameworks are now available for the study of restructured electricity markets; see, for
example, the EMCAS framework developed by researchers at the Argonne National
Laboratory (Conzelmann et al. 2004). In addition, researchers such as Bower and
Bunn (2001), Nicolaisen et al. (2001), Veit et al. (2006) and Widergren et al. (2004)
have used agent-based models to study important aspects of restructured electricity
markets.1
In a preliminary study (Koesrindartoto et al. 2005), we examined the feasibility and
potential fruitfulness of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) specifically for
the study of the WPMP market design. ACE is the computational study of economic
processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents.2
Building on this prior work, the present study reports on the development and
implementation of an ACE framework for testing the dynamic efficiency and reliability
of the WPMP market design. This framework—referred to as AMES (Agent-based
Modeling of Electricity Systems)—models strategic traders interacting over time in a
wholesale power market that is organized in accordance with core WPMP features and
that operates over a realistically rendered transmission grid. To our knowledge, AMES
is the first non-commercial open-source framework permitting the computational study
of the WPMP design.
To help ensure empirical input validity, the AMES framework has been developed
by means of an iterative participatory modeling approach.3 Specifically, we are
engaging with industry participants and policy makers in an ongoing collaborative
learning process involving four repeated stages of analysis: fieldwork and data collec-
tion; scenario discussion and role-playing games; agent-based model development;
and intensive computational experiments. We are relying heavily on business prac-
tices from two adopters of the WPMP design (New England and the Midwest) for
our implementation of market structure, market architecture, and dispatch and pricing
solutions. We have also incorporated reinforcement learning representations for the
electricity traders that are based on findings from human-subject multi-agent game
experiments conducted by Roth and Erev (1995).4
We are currently using the AMES framework to investigate the intermediate-term
performance of wholesale power markets operating under the WPMP market design.
1 See Tesfatsion (2006a) for extensive annotated pointers to agent-based electricity research.
2 See Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006), Tesfatsion (2006b), and Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) for extensive
introductory materials on ACE.
3 See Barreteau (2003) for a fuller discussion of iterative participatory modeling, also called companion
modeling. For more general materials on empirical validation methods for agent-based computational
models, see Tesfatsion (2006c) and Windrum et al. (2007).
4 Real-world market traders are understandably reluctant to discuss with us the precise manner in which
they determine their supply offers and demand bids, so indirect identification methods must be used.
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In particular, we are exploring the extent to which this design is capable of supporting
the efficient, profitable, and sustainable operation over time of existing generation
and transmission facilities, despite possible attempts by some market participants to
gain individual advantage through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and induced
transmission congestion.
To illustrate concretely the potential usefulness of the AMES framework for this
purpose, experimental findings are reported below for a dynamic extension of a static
five-node transmission grid test case used extensively for training purposes by the
ISO-NE and PJM. In the static training case, the generators are assumed to report their
true cost and production capacity attributes to the ISO; the possibility that generators
might engage in strategic reporting behavior is not considered. In contrast, the AMES
generators use reinforcement learning to decide the exact nature of the supply offers
(marginal cost functions and production intervals) that they daily report to the AMES
ISO for use in the WPMP day-ahead market. We show that all of the AMES generators
learn over time to implicitly collude on the reporting of higher-than-true marginal
costs, thus considerably raising total variable costs of operation at the ISO-determined
“optimal” solutions.
Our longer-run goal is to develop AMES into a framework that facilitates intensive
computational experiments for research and teaching purposes. Specifically targeted
framework features include:
• Research/teaching-grade tool (small to medium-scale grid size);
• Operational validity (structure, architecture, and behavioral dispositions);
• Permits dynamic testing with learning traders;
• Permits intensive sensitivity experiments;
• Open source (full access to implementation);
• Easy modification (extensible/modular architecture).
We envision academic researchers and teachers using this framework to increase their
qualitative understanding of the dynamic operation of restructured wholesale power
markets. Industry participants should be able to use the framework to familiarize them-
selves with market rules and to test business strategies. And policy makers should find
the framework useful for conducting intensive experiments to explore the performance
of actual or proposed market designs from a social welfare viewpoint. In particular,
does a design encourage the efficient and reliable operation of existing generation and
transmission capacity in the short term, and does it provide appropriate incentives for
investment in new generation and new transmission capacity in the longer term?
An overview of the AMES wholesale power market framework is presented in
Sect. 2, and detailed configuration settings for the AMES transmission grid, energy
traders, and ISO are presented in Sect. 3. Experimental findings for a dynamic five-
node transmission grid test case are presented in Sect. 4 making use of the configuration
settings from Sect. 3. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 5.
2 Overview of the AMES Framework
The AMES wholesale power market framework is programmed in Java using RepastJ,
a Java-based toolkit designed specifically for agent-based modeling in the social
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sciences.5 The framework is modular, extensible, and open source in order to pro-
vide a useful foundation for further electricity research.6
The AMES framework currently incorporates in stylized form several core elements
of the WPMP market design as implemented by the New England Independent System
Operator (ISO-NE) and the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), respec-
tively. By adhering closely to the architecture of these regional energy markets, we
have been able to take advantage of the business practice manuals, training guides, and
reports publicly released by the ISO-NE (2007) and the MISO (2007) for use by their
market participants. These publications provide a wealth of specific implementation
details missing from the more abstract WPMP template.
As depicted in Figs. 2–4, the core elements of the WPMP market design that have
been incorporated into the AMES framework to date are as follows:
• The AMES wholesale power market operates over an AC transmission grid for
DMax successive days, with each day D consisting of 24 successive hours
H = 00, 01, . . . , 23.
• The AMES wholesale power market includes an Independent System Opera-
tor (ISO) and a collection of energy traders consisting of Load-Serving Entities
(LSEs) and Generators distributed across the nodes of the transmission grid.7
• The AMES ISO undertakes the daily operation of the transmission grid within
a two-settlement system consisting of a Real-Time Market and a Day-Ahead
Market, each separately settled by means of locational marginal pricing.8
• During the afternoon of each day D the AMES ISO determines power commit-
ments and locational marginal prices (LMPs) 9 for the Day-Ahead Market for day
D + 1 based on Generator supply offers and LSE demand bids (forward financial
contracting) submitted during Hours 00–11 of day D.
5 See Tesfatsion (2006d) for resources related to the agent-based toolkit RepastJ. Agent-based researchers
are increasingly making use of powerful object-oriented programming (OOP) languages such as Java, C++,
or C# either directly or through some form of agent-based toolkit. Weisfeld (2003) provides an excellent
introduction to OOP. For a general annotated listing of OOP software and toolkits suitable for agent-based
modeling, see Tesfatsion (2006e).
6 In particular, the goal of the larger NSF project encompassing the development of the AMES framework
(McCalley et al. 2005) is to explore ways of achieving a more effectively integrated US energy transportation
network encompassing electricity, gas, coal, and water subsectors. The longer-term plan is to incrementally
extend the AMES framework to include consideration of these related energy subsectors.
7 An Independent System Operator (ISO) is an organization charged with the primary responsibility of
maintaining the security of a power system and often with system operation responsibilities as well. The ISO
is independent to the extent that it does not have a conflict of interest in carrying out these responsibilities,
such as an ownership stake in generation or transmission facilities within the power system. A Load
Serving Entity (LSE) is an electric utility, transmitting utility, or Federal power marketing agency that
has an obligation under Federal, State, or local law, or under long-term contracts, to provide electrical
power to end-use (residential or commercial) consumers or to other LSEs with end-use consumers. An LSE
aggregates individual end-use consumer demand into “load blocks” for bulk buying at the wholesale level.
A Generator is a unit that produces and sells electrical power in bulk at the wholesale level. A node is a
point on the transmission grid where power is injected or withdrawn.
8 Locational marginal pricing is the pricing of electrical power according to the location of its withdrawal
from, or injection into, a transmission grid.
9 A locational marginal price (LMP) at any particular node is the least cost of meeting demand at that node
for one additional unit of power, i.e. for one additional megawatt (MW).
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Fig. 2 A five-node transmission grid configuration
Fig. 3 AMES core features
• At the end of each day D the AMES ISO produces and posts a day D + 1 com-
mitment schedule for Generators and LSEs and settles these financially binding
contracts on the basis of day D + 1 LMPs.
• Any differences that arise during day D + 1 between real-time conditions and the
day-ahead financial contracts settled at the end of day D must be settled in the
Real-Time Market for day D + 1 at real-time LMPs for day D + 1.
• Transmission grid congestion in the Day-Ahead Market is managed via the inclu-
sion of congestion components in LMPs.
Five additional elements that will subsequently be incorporated into AMES to
reflect more fully the dynamic operational capabilities of the WPMP market design
are: (a) market power mitigation measures; (b) bilateral trading, which permits longer-
term contracting; (c) a market for financial transmission rights10 to permit AMES
10 A financial transmission right (FTR) purchased on a transmission line from node A to node B entitles
the holder to a compensation if the LMP at node B exceeds the LMP at node A, and obligates the holder to
make a payment if the LMP at node A exceeds the LMP at node B. See Sun (2006).
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Fig. 4 Activities of the AMES ISO during a typical day D
traders to hedge against transmission congestion costs arising in the Day-Ahead Mar-
ket; (d) security constraints incorporated into the DC-OPF problems solved by the
AMES ISO for the Real-Time Market and Day-Ahead Market as a hedge against
system disturbances; and (e) a (Resource Offer) Re-Bid Period11 during each day D
as part of a resource adequacy assessment undertaken by the AMES ISO to help
ensure that forecasted loads and reserve requirements are always met. Figures 5 and 6
schematically depict the architecture and dynamic flow of this extended AMES
framework.
As explained more carefully in Sect. 3.5 below, the AMES ISO determines hourly
power commitments/dispatch levels and LMPs for the Day-Ahead Market and Real-
Time Market by solving DC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problems that approximate
underlying AC-OPF problems. To handle these aspects, we have developed an ac-
curate and efficient strictly convex quadratic programming (SCQP) solver module,
QuadProgJ, wrapped in an outer DC-OPF data conversion shell, DCOPFJ (Sun and
Tesfatsion 2006, 2007b). The AMES ISO solves its DC-OPF problems by invoking
QuadProgJ through DCOPFJ.
As detailed in Sect. 3.6 below, trader learning is implemented in the AMES
framework by a reinforcement learning module, JReLM, developed by Gieseler (2005).
JReLM can implement a variety of different reinforcement learning methods, permitting
11 Here we follow the MISO market architecture and terminology. The ISO-NE implements a similar
design feature during each day D called the “(Real-Time Energy Market) Supply Re-Offer Period.”
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Fig. 5 AMES architecture (Agent hierarchy)
Fig. 6 AMES dynamic market activities: global view
flexible representation of trader learning within this family of methods. In later exten-
sions of AMES, other possible trader learning methods (e.g. social mimicry and belief
learning) will also be considered.
The QuadProgJ/DCOPFJ and JReLM modules for ISO grid operation and trader
learning constitute the core components supporting the implementation of the AMES
wholesale power market framework. This implementation is schematically depicted
in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7 Core module components of the AMES framework
3 Configuration of the AMES Framework
3.1 Overview
This section provides basic configuration information for the AMES wholesale power
market framework as currently implemented. All subsequently reported experiments
make use of these configurations.
For later ease of reference, the admissible exogenous variables for the AMES
framework are depicted and defined in Table 1 and the endogenous variables are
depicted and defined in Table 2.12 These variable depictions and definitions will be
used throughout the remainder of this study.
3.2 Structural Configuration of the AMES Transmission Grid
The structural specification of transmission grids is complicated due to the underlying
physical relations governing power flows. Below we briefly summarize the AMES
grid specification to indicate the care that has been taken to properly account for these
underlying relations. The interested reader is referred to Sun and Tesfatsion (2006) and
references therein for a more complete and rigorous discussion of this specification.
The AMES transmission grid is an alternating current (AC) grid modeled as a
balanced three-phase network with N ≥ 1 branches and K ≥ 2 nodes. The
12 Only persistent variables appear in these tables. Locally scoped variables temporarily introduced to carry
out method implementations are not included.
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Table 1 Admissible exogenous variables for the AMES framework
Variable Description Admissibility restrictions
K Total number of transmission grid nodes K > 0
N Total number of distinct network branches N > 0
I Total number of generators I > 0
J Total number of LSEs J > 0
Ik Set of generators located at node k Card(∪Kk=1 Ik ) = I
Jk Set of LSEs located at node k Card(∪Kk=1 Jk ) = J
So Base apparent power (three-phase MVAs) So ≥ 1
Vo Base voltage (line-to-line kVs) Vo > 0
Vk Voltage magnitude (kVs) at node k Vk = Vo, k = 1, . . . , K
pL j Real power load (MWs) withdrawn by LSE j pL j ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J
km Branch connecting nodes k and m (if one exists) k = m
B R Set of all distinct branches km, k < m B R = ∅
Xkm Reactance (ohms) for branch km Xkm = Xmk > 0, km ∈ B R
Bkm [1/Xkm ] for branch km Bkm = Bmk > 0, km ∈ B R
PUkm Thermal limit (MWs) for real power flow on km PUkm > 0, km ∈ B R
δ1 Reference node 1 voltage angle (radians) δ1 = 0
π Soft penalty weight for voltage angle differences π > 0
Moneyoi Initial money holdings ($) for Gen i Moneyoi > 0, i = 1, . . . , I
CapLi True lower production limit (MWs) for Gen i CapLi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I
CapUi True upper production limit (MWs) for Gen i CapUi > CapLi , i = 1, . . . , I
ai , bi True cost coefficients ($/MWh, $/MW2h) for Gen i bi > 0, i = 1, . . . , I
MCi (p) MCi (p) = ai + 2bi p = Gen i’s true MC function MCi (CapLi ) > 0, i = 1, . . . , I
FCosti Fixed costs (hourly prorated) for Gen i FCosti ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I
Mi Cardinality of the action domain ADi for Gen i Mi ≥ 1, i = 1, . . . , I
M ji Integer-valued density-control parameter for ADi
∏3
j=1 M ji = Mi , i = 1, . . . , I
RIMaxLi Range-index parameter for ADi construction RIMax
L
i ∈ [0, 1), i = 1, . . . , I
RIMaxUi Range-index parameter for ADi construction RIMax
U
i ∈ [0, 1), i = 1, . . . , I
RIMinCi Range-index parameter for ADi construction RIMin
C
i ∈ (0, 1], i = 1, . . . , I
SSi Slope-start control parameter for ADi construction SSi > 0, i = 1, . . . , I
qi (0) Initial propensity (learning) Any real value, i = 1, . . . , I
Ci Cooling parameter (learning) Ci > 0, i = 1, . . . , I
ri Recency parameter (learning) 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , I
ei Experimentation parameter (learning) 0 ≤ ei < 1, i = 1, . . . , I
Table 2 Endogenous variables for the AMES framework
Variable Description
pGi Real power injection (MWs) by Gen i = 1, . . . , I
δk Voltage angle (radians) at node k = 2, . . . , K
LMPk Locational marginal price ($/MWh) at node k = 1, . . . , K
Pkm Real power (MWs) flowing in branch km ∈ BR
PGenk Total real power injection (MWs) at node k = 1, . . . , K
PLoadk Total real power withdrawal (MWs) at node k = 1, . . . , K
PNetInjectk Total net real power injection (MWs) at node k = 1, . . . , K
Profiti Realized profit ($/h) for Gen i = 1, . . . , I
Moneyi Cumulative money holdings ($) for Gen i = 1, . . . , I
CapRLi Reported lower production limit (MWs) for Gen i = 1, . . . , I
CapRUi Reported upper production limit (MWs) for Gen i = 1, . . . , I
a Ri , b
R
i Reported cost coefficients ($/MWh, $/MW2h) for Gen i = 1, . . . , I
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reactance on each branch is assumed to be a total branch reactance (rather than a
per mile reactance), meaning that the branch length is already taken into account. All
transformer phase angle shifts are assumed to be zero, all transformer tap ratios are as-
sumed to be 1, all line-charging capacitances are assumed to be 0, and the temperature
is assumed to remain constant over time.
The AMES transmission grid is assumed to be connected in the sense that it has
no isolated components; each pair of nodes k and m is connected by a linked branch
path consisting of one or more branches. If two nodes are in direct connection with
each other, it is assumed to be through at most one branch, i.e., branch groups are not
explicitly considered. However, complete connectivity is not assumed. That is, node
pairs are not necessarily in direct connection with each other through a single branch.
For per unit normalization in DC-OPF implementations, it is conventional to specify
base value settings for apparent power (in megavoltamperes MVA) and voltage (in
kilovolts kV). For the AMES transmission grid, the base apparent power, denoted by
So, is assumed to be measured in three-phase MVAs, and the base voltage, denoted by
Vo, is assumed to be measured in line-to-line kVs.
It is also assumed that Kirchoff’s Current Law (KCL) governing current flows in
electrical networks holds for the AMES transmission grid for each hour of operation.
As detailed in (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004, Sect. 6.2.2.1), KCL implies that real and
reactive power must each be in balance at each node. Thus, real power must also be in
balance across the entire grid, in the sense that aggregate real power withdrawal plus
aggregate transmission losses must equal aggregate real power injection.
In wholesale power markets restructured in accordance with the WPMP market
design, the transmission grid is overlaid with a commercial network consisting of
“pricing locations” for the purchase and sale of electric power. A pricing location is a
location at which market transactions are settled using publicly available LMPs. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the set of pricing locations for AMES coincides with the
set of transmission grid nodes.
3.3 Structural Configuration of the AMES LSEs
The AMES LSEs purchase bulk power in the AMES wholesale power market each
day in order to service customer demand (load) in a downstream retail market. The
user specifies the number J of LSEs as well as the location of these LSEs at various
nodes of the transmission grid. LSEs do not engage in production or sale activities in
the wholesale power market. Hence, LSEs purchase power only from Generators, not
from each other.
For initial simplicity, the current study makes the usual empirically-based assump-
tion that the downstream retail demands serviced by the AMES LSEs exhibit negli-
gible price sensitivity and hence reduce to daily load profiles. In addition, the LSEs
are modeled as passive entities who submit these daily load profiles into the Day-
Ahead Market as their demand bids without strategic consideration. Specifically, at
the beginning of each day D each LSE j submits a daily load profile into the day-ahead
market for day D + 1. This daily load profile indicates the real power demand pL j (H)
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(in MWs) that must be serviced by LSE j in its downstream retail market for each of
24 successive hours H.
3.4 Structural Configuration of the AMES Generators
The AMES Generators are electric power generating units. The user specifies the
number I of Generators as well as the location of these Generators at various nodes
of the transmission grid. Generators sell power only to LSEs, not to each other. Each
AMES Generator i is user-configured with a production technology, learning capabi-
lities, and an initial level Moneyoi of money holdings. Here we elaborate on Generator
production technologies; learning capabilities are separately taken up in Subsect. 3.6
below.
With regard to production technology, it is assumed that each Generator has variable
and fixed costs of production. However, Generators do not incur no-load, startup, or
shutdown costs, and they do not face ramping constraints.13
More precisely, the technology attributes assumed for each Generator i take the
following form. Generator i has lower and upper production limits (in MWs), denoted
by CapLi and Cap
U
i , that define the feasible production interval for its hourly real-power
production level pGi (in MWs).14 That is, for each i ,
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapUi (1)
In addition, Generator i has a total cost function giving its total costs of production
per hour for each pGi . This total cost function takes the form
TCi (pGi ) = ai · pGi + bi · p2Gi + FCosti (2)
where ai ($/MWh), bi ($/MW2h), and FCosti ($/h) are exogenously given constants.
Note that TCi (pGi ) is measured in dollars per hour ($/h). Generator i’s total variable
cost function and (hourly prorated) fixed costs for any pGi are then given by15
TVCi (pGi ) = TCi (pGi ) − TCi (0) = ai · pGi + bi · p2Gi (3)
13 As is standard in economics, variable costs are costs that vary with the level of production, and fixed
costs are costs such as debt and equity obligations associated with plant investments that are not dependent
on the level of production and that are incurred even if production ceases. As detailed by Kirschen and
Strbac (2004, Sect. 4.3), the concept of no-load costs in power engineering refers to quasi-fixed costs that
would be incurred by Generators if they could be kept running at zero output but that would vanish once
shut-down occurs. Startup costs are costs specifically incurred when a Generator starts up, and shutdown
costs are costs specifically incurred when a Generator shuts down. Finally, ramping constraints refer to
physical restrictions on the rates at which Generators can increase or decrease their outputs.
14 In the current AMES framework, the lower production limit CapLi for each Generator i is a firm “must
run” minimum real-power production level. That is, if CapLi is positive, then shutting down Generator i is
not an option for the AMES ISO.
15 Quadratic functions as in Eq. 3 are commonly used to represent generator total variable costs (i.e. costs
of operation) in power systems research; for example, see Shahidehpour et al. (2002). Variable costs in
actual wholesale power markets primarily reflect fuel and labor costs, and additional study is needed to
gauge the extent to which quadratic functions can adequately represent these costs.
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and
FCosti = TCi (0) (4)
respectively. Finally, the marginal cost function for Generator i takes the form
MCi (pGi ) = ai + 2 · bi · pGi (5)
At the beginning of each day D, each Generator i reports a supply offer s Ri (D) to
the AMES ISO for use in each hour H of the Day-Ahead Market for day D + 1. This
supply offer consists of a reported marginal cost function (i.e., supply schedule)
MCRi (pGi ) = aRi + 2 · bRi · pGi (6)
defined over a reported feasible production interval16
CapRLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapRUi (7)
This supply offer can be strategic in the sense that the reported cost coefficients aRi
and bRi in Eq. 6 can deviate from Generator i’s true cost coefficients ai and bi in Eq. 5
and the reported feasible production interval [CapRLi , CapRUi ] in Eq. 7 can deviate
from Generator i’s true feasible production interval [CapLi , CapUi ] in Eq. 1.
Suppose Generator i is located at node k, and suppose Generator i in some day D
reports a supply offer s Ri (D) to the AMES ISO for the day D + 1 Day-Ahead Market
(along with all other Generators). Let L M Pk denote the node-k locational marginal
price (LMP) that is then subsequently determined by the AMES ISO in day D for
some hour H of day D + 1, and let p∗Gi denote the real power that Generator i has been
cleared to inject at node k in hour H of day D + 1. Then the (possibly negative) profit
accruing to Generator i in day D from the day-D settlement of this financially binding
contract for hour H of day D + 1 is
Profitnewi (p
∗
Gi ) = LMPk · p∗Gi − TCi (p∗Gi ) (8)
16 As emphasized by Cain and Alvarado (2004), the implications of supply offer formats for the operation
of wholesale power markets is an important topic in need of further study. Here we follow the basic form
of the generator supply offers required by the MISO (2007) and ISO-NE (2007): namely, non-decreasing
supply schedules accompanied by minimum and maximum real power production capacities. However, we
assume linear supply schedules to ease the specification of the learning problem for the AMES Generators
whereas the MISO and ISO-NE require step-function supply schedules. (Interestingly, in the ISO-NE the
generators can check a “UseOfferSlope” box permitting the ISO to approximate their step-function supply
schedules by smoother curves.) In addition, for initial simplicity, we follow the current practice of the
ISO-NE in only permitting the AMES Generators to submit one supply offer to be used for each hour of
the Day-Ahead Market, whereas the MISO permits generators to submit a separate supply offer for each
hour of the Day-Ahead Market.
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Moreover, as a result of this settlement, the updated cumulated money holdings for
Generator i are given by
Moneynewi = Moneyprevi + Profitnewi (p∗Gi ) (9)
Since Generator i’s profits (Eq. 8) can be negative, it is clear from Eq. 9 that
Generator i faces a risk of insolvency, i.e., a risk that its money holdings will run
out. Any Generator that becomes insolvent must immediately exit the market, which
results in the loss of its production capacity to the market. Furthermore, no entry of
new generation is permitted in the current implementation of the AMES framework.
3.5 Structural Configuration of the ISO
As in actual ISO-managed wholesale power markets operating under the WPMP
market design, the AMES ISO during each day D is charged with determining a
schedule of optimal power commitments and LMPs for each hour of the Day-Ahead
Market in day D + 1. This schedule is conditional on LSE-reported demand bids,
Generator-reported supply offers, thermal limits on branch flows, and nodal balance
constraints ensuring supply equals demand (load) at each transmission grid node.
As usual, “optimal” is interpreted to mean that total net surplus is maximized.
The resulting optimization problem is known as a bid-based AC optimal power flow
(OPF) problem. As typically done in actual markets, the AMES ISO approximates
this difficult bid-based AC-OPF problem by means of a simpler bid-based DC-OPF
problem in which real power constraints are linearized and reactive power constraints
are ignored. A brief discussion of this bid-based DC-OPF problem will now be given.17
Recall from Sect. 3.3 that the AMES LSEs are currently modeled as non-strategic
entities servicing price-insensitive loads whose reported demand bids in each day D
take the form of their true daily load profiles. In this case the maximization of total net
surplus reduces to the minimization of Generator-reported total variable cost. Using
the variable definitions in Tables 1 and 2, the bid-based DC-OPF problem solved by
the AMES ISO in day D for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market in day D + 1 is then
as follows:
Minimize Generator-reported total variable cost
I∑
i=1
[
aRi pGi + bRi p2Gi
]
(10)
with respect to real-power production levels and voltage angles
pGi , i = 1, . . . , I ; δk, k = 1, . . . , K
17 Sun and Tesfatsion (2006) motivate in detail the form of the objective function and constraints for this
bid-based DC-OPF problem as well as explaining carefully how it is derived from an AC-OPF problem
given certain standard simplifying assumptions.
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subject to:
Real power balance constraint for each node k = 1, . . . , K :
0 = PLoadk − PGenk + PNetInjectk (11)
where
PLoadk =
∑
j∈Jk
pL j (12)
PGenk =
∑
i∈Ik
pGi (13)
PNetInjectk =
∑
km or mk∈B R
Pkm (14)
Pkm = Bkm[Vo]2[δk − δm] (15)
Real power thermal constraints for each branch km ∈ B R:
|Pkm | ≤ PUkm (16)
Reported real-power production constraints for each Generator i = 1, . . . , I :
CapRLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapRUi (17)
Voltage angle setting at reference node 1:
δ1 = 0 (18)
As shown in Sun and Tesfatsion (2006), this DC-OPF problem can equivalently be
represented in the numerically desirable form of a strictly convex quadratic
programming (SCQP) problem if the balance constraints Eq. 11 are used to elimi-
nate the voltage angles δk by substitution. However, this elimination prevents direct
generation of solution values for LMPs since, by definition, the LMP for node k is the
solution value for the multiplier (shadow price) for the kth nodal balance constraint.
For this reason, we replace the standard DC-OPF objective function (Eq. 10) with
the following augmented form:
I∑
i=1
[
aRi pGi + bRi p2Gi
]
+ π
[
∑
km∈B R
[δk − δm]2
]
, (19)
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where π is a positive soft penalty weight on the sum of squared voltage angle
differences. As carefully demonstrated in Sun and Tesfatsion (2006), the augmen-
ted DC-OPF objective function (Eq. 19) provides a number of benefits based on both
physical and mathematical considerations.
First, the resulting augmented DC-OPF problem now has a numerically desirable
SCQP form permitting the direct generation of solution values for LMPs as well as for
real power production levels, branch flows, and voltage angles. Second, the validity
of the DC-OPF problem as an approximation for the underlying AC-OPF problem
relies on an assumption of small voltage angle differences, and the augmented DC-
OPF problem permits this assumption to be subjected to systematic sensitivity tests
through variations in the penalty weight π . Third, solution differences between the
non-augmented and augmented forms of the DC-OPF problem can be reduced to
arbitrarily small levels by selecting an appropriately small value for π .
To solve this augmented DC-OPF problem, the AMES ISO invokes the SCQP solver
QuadProgJ through an outer shell DCOPFJ. More precisely, as illustrated below in
Sect. 4, the AMES ISO passes to DCOPFJ current DC-OPF input data in standard
(SI) units together with base apparent power and voltage values So and Vo. DCOPFJ
converts this SI input data into per unit (pu) form and performs all needed matrix and
vector representations. DCOPFJ then invokes QuadProgJ to solve for LMPs, voltage
angles, real power production levels, real power branch flows, and various other useful
quantities with all internal calculation carried out in pu terms. QuadProgJ then passes
these pu solution values back to DCOPFJ, which outputs them in SI units.
In future studies, the AMES ISO will also have to solve DC-OPF problems for the
Real-Time Market to settle any differences that arise between day-ahead commitments
and real-time conditions due to system disturbances (e.g., sudden line outages or
changes in demand). However, in our initial experiments with the AMES framework
we are not considering system disturbances that would cause such differences to
arise. Consequently, all load obligations are fully met through Day-Ahead Market
transactions and the Real-Time Market is inactive.
3.6 Learning Configuration for the AMES Generators
In general, multiple Generators at multiple nodes could be under the control of a
single generation company (“GenCo”). This control aspect is critically important to
recognize for the study of real-world strategic trading. This situation can be handled in
the AMES framework by permitting coordinated learning across Generators controlled
by a single GenCo.
For initial simplicity, however, the AMES Generators are currently modeled as
autonomous energy traders with strategic learning capabilities; see Fig. 8. Each AMES
Generator adaptively selects its supply offers on the basis of its own past profit out-
comes using a version of a stochastic reinforcement learning algorithm developed by
Roth–Erev (1995) based on human-subject experiments, hereafter referred to as the
VRE learning algorithm. This section briefly outlines the implementation of the VRE
learning algorithm for an arbitrary Generator i .
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Fig. 8 A computational generator (Seller)
Suppose it is the beginning of the initial day D = 1, and Generator i must choose
a supply offer from its action domain ADi to report to the AMES ISO for the Day-
Ahead Market in day D + 1. As will be seen below in Sect. 3.6, for learning purposes
the only relevant attribute of ADi is that it has finite cardinality Mi ≥ 1.18
The initial propensity of Generator i to choose supply offer m ∈ ADi is given by
qim(0). In general, these initial propensities can be any real numbers as specified by
the AMES user. However, the default setting used in this study is that these initial
propensities are equal. That is, we specify a fixed value qi (0) such that
qim(0) = qi (0) for all supply offers m ∈ ADi (20)
Now consider the beginning of any day D ≥ 1, and suppose the current propensity
of Generator i to choose supply offer m ∈ ADi is given by qim(D). The choice
probabilities that Generator i uses to select a supply offer for day D are constructed
from these propensities as follows:19
pim(D) = exp(qim(D)/Ci )∑Mi
j=1 exp(qi j (D)/Ci )
, m ∈ ADi (21)
In Eq. 21, Ci is a cooling parameter that affects the degree to which Generator i
makes use of propensity values in determining its choice probabilities. As Ci → ∞,
18 The construction of each Generator i’s action domain ADi is outlined in Sect. 3.7, below, and carefully
explained in Sun and Tesfatsion (2007a, Appendix). The key issue is how to construct the sets ADi to give
each Generator an economically meaningful and realistically flexible selection of supply offers without
introducing hidden structural biases favoring some Generators over others.
19 In the original algorithm developed by Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and Erev (1995), the choice
probabilities are defined in terms of relative propensity levels. Here, instead, use is made of a “simulated
annealing” formulation in terms of exponentials. As will be seen below in Eq. 22, in the current context the
propensity values can take on negative values if sufficiently large negative profit outcomes are experienced,
and the use of exponentials ensures that the choice probabilities remain well defined even in this event.
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then pim(D) → 1/Mi , so that in the limit Generator i pays no attention to propensity
values in forming its choice probabilities. On the other hand, as Ci → 0, the choice
probabilities (Eq. 21) become increasingly peaked over the particular supply offers m
having the highest propensity values qim(D), thereby increasing the probability that
these supply offers will be chosen.
At the end of day D, the current propensity qim(D) that Generator i associates with
each supply offer m ∈ ADi is updated in accordance with the following rule. Let m′
denote the supply offer that was actually selected and reported into the Day-Ahead
Market by Generator i in day D, and let Profitim′(D) denote the profits (positive or
negative) attained by Generator i in the settlement of the Day-Ahead Market at the
end of day D in response to its choice of supply offer m′. Then, for each supply offer
m ∈ ADi ,20
qim(D + 1) = [1 − ri ]qim(D) + Responseim(D), (22)
where
Responseim(D) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
[1 − ei ] · Profitim′(D) if m = m′
ei · qim(D)/[Mi − 1] if m = m′,
(23)
where m = m′ implies Mi ≥ 2. The introduction of the recency parameter ri in Eq. 22
acts as a damper on the growth of the propensities over time. The experimentation
parameter ei in Eq. 23 permits reinforcement to spill over to some extent from a
chosen supply offer to other supply offers to encourage continued experimentation
with various supply offers in the early stages of the learning process.
Generator i faces a trade-off in each day D between information exploitation and
information exploration. The VRE learning algorithm outlined above resolves this
trade-off by ensuring continual exploration but at a typically declining rate. More
precisely, under the VRE learning algorithm, note that Generator i in day D does not
necessarily choose a supply offer with the highest accumulated profits to date. Given a
suitably small value for ei , selected supply offers generating the highest accumulated
profits tend to have a relatively higher probability of being chosen, but there is always
a chance that other supply offers will be chosen instead. This ensures that Generator
i continues to experiment with new supply offers to some degree, even if its choice
probability distribution becomes peaked at a particular selected supply offer because
of relatively good profit outcomes. This helps to reduce the risk of premature fixation
20 The response function appearing in Eq. 22 modifies the response function appearing in the original
algorithm developed by Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and Erev (1995). The modification is introduced to
ensure that learning (updating of choice probabilities) occurs even in response to zero-profit outcomes, which
are particularly likely to arise in initial periods when Generator i is just beginning to experiment with different
supply offers and the risk of overbidding to the point of non-dispatch is relatively high. See Koesrindartoto
(2002) for a detailed discussion and experimental exploration of this zero-profit updating problem with the
original Roth–Erev learning algorithm. See Nicolaisen et al. (2001) for a detailed motivation, presentation,
and experimental application of the modified response function.
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on suboptimal supply offers in the early stages of the decision process when relatively
few supply offers have been tried.
In summary, the complete VRE learning algorithm applied to Generator i is fully
characterized once user-specified values are provided for the number Mi of feasible
supply offer selections in ADi , the initial propensity value qi (0) in Eq. 20, the cooling
parameter Ci in Eq. 21, the recency parameter ri in Eq. 22, and the experimentation
parameter ei in Eq. 23. It is interesting to note, in particular, that the VRE learning algo-
rithm is well-defined for any action domain AD consisting of finitely many elements
Mi , regardless of the precise nature of these elements.
3.7 Construction of Generator Action Domains
The construction of action domains (supply offer choice sets) for the AMES Generators
is a critical modeling issue. Empirical sensibility suggests these action domains should
permit flexible choice from among a wide range of possible supply offers, and that
the degree of flexibility should be roughly similar across the Generators. On the other
hand, computational practicality suggests the number of supply offers included in each
action domain should not be unduly large.
This subsection briefly summarizes how action domains have been constructed
for the AMES Generators in accordance with these objectives. A detailed rigorous
discussion can be found in Sun and Tesfatsion (2007a, Appendix).
As explained in Sect. 3.6, at the beginning of each day D each AMES Generator i
uses VRE reinforcement learning to choose a supply offer s Ri to report to the AMES
ISO for each hour H of the day D + 1 Day-Ahead Market. Each supply offer s Ri takes
the form of a reported marginal cost function
MCRi (p) = aRi + 2bRi p (24)
defined over a reported feasible production interval
CapRLi ≤ p ≤ CapRUi (25)
Here aRi and bRi are Generator i’s reported cost coefficients, p denotes Generator i’s
hourly real-power production level, and CapRLi and Cap
RU
i are Generator i’s reported
lower and upper real-power production limits.
Each AMES Generator i chooses its supply offers s Ri from an action domain ADi
with finite positive cardinality Mi . In keeping with the modeling goals of empirical
sensibility and computational practicality, the action domain ADi for each AMES
Generator i is constructed under five simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
Generator i only reports upward-sloping marginal cost functions (Eq. 24), i.e., bRi > 0.
Second, we assume Generator i only reports non-trivial feasible production intervals
(Eq. 25), i.e., CapRLi < CapRUi . Third, we assume Generator i only reports margi-
nal cost curves that lie on or above its true marginal cost curve over the range of its
accompanying reported production intervals. Fourth, we assume Generator i always
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reports its true lower production limit.21 Fifth, we assume Generator i always reports
an upper production limit that is less than or equal to its true upper production limit.
Let a supply offer s Ri for Generator i be called admissible if the corresponding
reported marginal cost function MCRi (p) and reported lower and upper production
limits CapRLi and Cap
RU
i are in compliance with the five simplifying assumptions.
As shown in Sun and Tesfatsion (2007a, Appendix), given any positive value for a
slope-start parameter SSi for Generator i , any 4-dimensional vector s Ai consisting
of four components in percentage form can be uniquely mapped into an admissible
supply offer s Ri for Generator i .
Referring to Table 1 for precise variable definitions, one can then construct a matrix
ADi for Generator i characterized by three integer-valued density-control parameters
M1i , M2i , and M3i (with M1i ×M2i ×M3i = Mi ) and three range-index parameters
RIMaxLi , RIMax
U
i , and RIMin
C
i in percentage form that has the following property:
For any given SSi > 0, the Mi rows of this matrix constitute Mi distinct vectors s Ai in
percentage form that can be transformed uniquely into Mi distinct admissible supply
offers s Ri for Generator i . Consequently, the matrix ADi effectively constitutes an
action domain for Generator i consisting of Mi admissible supply offers s Ri .
Moreover, if the parameters (M1i , M2i , M3i , RIMaxLi , RIMax
U
i , RIMin
C
i , SSi )
are set identically across the Generators and the above construction is applied for each
Generator i = 1, . . . , I , the result is a collection {ADi : i = 1, . . . , I } of Generator-
specific action domains that have equal cardinalities and whose supply-offer elements
s R provide similar densities of coverage of the regions lying above the Generators’
true marginal cost curves.
4 Dynamic Five-Node Test Case
4.1 Overview
Consider a situation in which five Generators and three LSEs are distributed across
a 5-node transmission grid as depicted in Fig. 2. An interesting aspect of this trans-
mission grid is that not all nodes are directly connected; for example, node 5 is not
directly connected to either node 2 or node 3.
Originally due to John Lally (2002), this five-node transmission grid configuration is
now used extensively in ISO-NE/PJM training manuals to solve for DC-OPF solutions
at a given point in time conditional on variously specified marginal costs and production
limits for the generators and variously specified price-insensitive loads for the LSEs.
The implicit assumption in all of these static training exercises is that the true cost and
21 As explained in footnote 14, the Generators’ reported lower production limits are treated as firm by
the AMES ISO. Since the current version of AMES lacks market power mitigation rules, the AMES
Generators could ensure themselves arbitrarily high profits if they were permitted to report arbitrarily high
lower production limits into the Day-Ahead Market. For this reason, it is assumed in the current study that
the AMES Generators are closely monitored by the AMES ISO with regard to these lower production limits,
ensuring that they always report their true lower limits. In the actual MISO and ISO-NE energy markets,
generators are requested to report their true lower and upper production limits, but it is not clear from the
MISO and ISO-NE business practices manuals just how closely generators are actually monitored to ensure
compliance.
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Table 3 Dynamic 5-node test case—DC-OPF structural input data (SI)
Base values
So Vo
100.0 10.0
K a πb
5 0.05
Branch
From To lineCapc Xd
1 2 250.0 0.0281
1 4 150.0 0.0304
1 5 400.0 0.0064
2 3 350.0 0.0108
3 4 240.0 0.0297
4 5 240.0 0.0297
Gen ID atNode FCost a b CapL CapU Init$
1 1 1600.0 14.0 0.005 0.0 110.0 $1.0M
2 1 1200.0 15.0 0.006 0.0 100.0 $1.0M
3 3 8500.0 25.0 0.010 0.0 520.0 $1.0M
4 4 1000.0 30.0 0.012 0.0 200.0 $1.0M
5 5 5400.0 10.0 0.007 0.0 600.0 $1.0M
LSE
ID atNode L-00e L-01 L-02 L-03 L-04 L-05 L-06 L-07
1 2 350.00 322.93 305.04 296.02 287.16 291.59 296.02 314.07
2 3 300.00 276.80 261.47 253.73 246.13 249.93 253.73 269.20
3 4 250.00 230.66 217.89 211.44 205.11 208.28 211.44 224.33
ID atNode L-08 L-09 L-10 L-11 L-12 L-13 L-14 L-15
1 2 358.86 394.80 403.82 408.25 403.82 394.80 390.37 390.37
2 3 307.60 338.40 346.13 349.93 346.13 338.40 334.60 334.60
3 4 256.33 282.00 288.44 291.61 288.44 282.00 278.83 278.83
ID atNode L-16 L-17 L-18 L-19 L-20 L-21 L-22 L-23
1 2 408.25 448.62 430.73 426.14 421.71 412.69 390.37 363.46
2 3 349.93 384.53 369.20 365.26 361.47 353.73 334.60 311.53
3 4 291.61 320.44 307.67 304.39 301.22 294.78 278.83 259.61
a Total number of nodes
b Soft penalty weight π for voltage angle differences
c Upper limit PUkm (in MWs) on the magnitude of real power flow in branch km
d Reactance Xkm (in ohms) for branch km
e L-H: Load L (in MWs) for hour H, where H = 00, 01, . . . , 23
true production limits of the generators are known. Nowhere is any mention made of
the possibility that generators in real-world ISO-managed wholesale power markets
might learn to exercise market power over time through strategic reporting of their
cost and production attributes.
In this section we illustrate how the AMES wholesale power market framework can
be used to transform these static training exercises into a more realistic dynamic form
with strategic learning. Detailed grid, production, and load input data for a specific
dynamic five-node test case are provided in Table 3.22 As seen in this table, and
22 The transmission grid configuration, reactances, locations of the Generators and LSEs, and initial hour-0
load levels in Table 3 are taken from Lally (2002). The general shape of the LSE load profiles is adopted
from a 3-node example presented in Shahidehpour et al. (2002, pp. 296–297).
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Fig. 9 24 Hour load distribution for the dynamic 5-node test case
depicted graphically in Fig. 9, the daily load profile for each LSE is price insensitive
and peaks at hour 17. Note, also, that Generator 4 is a “peaker” unit with relatively
high hourly marginal costs MC(p) = 30+0.024p for each p, where p denotes hourly
real-power production in megawatts (MWs). Also, each Generator has a finite upper
limit CapU on its hourly real power production.
We report below our findings for two experimental treatments. In the first benchmark
“no learning” treatment, the Generators are assumed to report to the ISO their true
marginal cost functions and true production limits. In the second “learning” treat-
ment, the Generators can report strategic supply offers to the ISO. More precisely,
the Generators still must report their true production limits to the ISO, but they can
now learn over time what marginal cost attributes to report to the ISO in an attempt
to increase their profit earnings.23 All runs for both treatments were carried out on a
laptop PC: namely, a Compaq Presario 2100 running under Windows XP SP2 (mobile
AMD Athlon XP 2800 + 2.12 GHz, 496 MB of RAM). For the no-learning treatment
(one run), the run time was approximately 4.3 s. For the learning treatment (20 runs),
the average run time was 4.5 min.
Our findings for the no-learning treatment are detailed in Sect. 4.3. These findings
reveal the complicated effects of daily load profiles, transmission congestion, and
production limits on LMP determination over time, even in the absence of strategic
supply-offer reporting by Generators.
Our findings for the learning treatment are detailed in Sect. 4.3. The existence of
price-insensitive loads provides a potentially golden opportunity for the two largest
Generators 3 and 5 to exercise market power. Note from Table 3 that the peak load in
hour 17 is 1153.59, and that the combined capacity of the smallest three Generators
1, 2, and 4 is only 410 MWs. It follows that this peak load cannot be met unless
Generator 3 (520 MWs) and Generator 5 (600 MWs) are both dispatched to some
23 The Generators thus behave as if they were in a leader-follower game with the ISO. Since the Generators
as currently implemented do not explicitly recognize the presence of rival Generators in their choice envi-
ronments, there is no strategic interaction among the Generators per se.
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Table 4 No-learning dynamic 5-node test case—solution value (SI) for real power branch flow Pkm , with
associated thermal limit PUkm , for each distinct branch km
Hour Pa12 P14 P15 P23 P34 P45
00 250.00 129.65 −255.77 −100.00 −67.47 −187.82
01 250.00 126.71 −253.27 −72.93 −80.32 −184.27
02 250.00 124.77 −251.61 −55.04 −88.81 −181.93
03 250.00 123.79 −250.77 −46.02 −93.09 −180.74
04 250.00 122.83 −249.95 −37.16 −97.30 −179.58
05 250.00 123.31 −250.36 −41.59 −95.19 −180.16
06 250.00 123.79 −250.77 −46.02 −93.09 −180.74
07 250.00 125.75 −252.45 −64.07 −84.52 −183.11
08 250.00 130.61 −256.60 −108.86 −63.26 −188.98
09 250.00 134.51 −259.92 −144.80 −46.20 −193.69
10 250.00 135.49 −260.76 −153.82 −41.92 −194.87
11 250.00 135.97 −261.17 −158.25 −39.81 −195.45
12 250.00 135.49 −260.76 −153.82 −41.92 −194.87
13 250.00 134.51 −259.92 −144.80 −46.20 −193.69
14 250.00 134.03 −259.51 −140.37 −48.30 −193.11
15 250.00 134.03 −259.51 −140.37 −48.30 −193.11
16 250.00 135.97 −261.17 −158.25 −39.81 −195.45
17 250.00 98.83 −346.76 −198.62 −63.15 −175.88
18 250.00 137.64 −274.17 −180.73 −29.93 −199.96
19 250.00 137.91 −262.83 −176.14 −31.32 −197.80
20 250.00 137.43 −262.42 −171.71 −33.42 −197.22
21 250.00 136.45 −261.58 −162.69 −37.71 −196.03
22 250.00 134.03 −259.51 −140.37 −48.30 −193.11
23 250.00 131.11 −257.02 −113.46 −61.08 −189.58
PU12 P
U
14 P
U
15 P
U
23 P
U
34 P
U
45
250.00 150.00 400.00 350.00 240.00 240.00
a In accordance with the usual convention, the real power Pkm flowing along a branch km is positively
valued if and only if real power is flowing from node k to node m
extent. Consequently, if these profit-seeking Generators had full structural information,
their reported marginal costs should be as high as permitted by their action domains.
The question is whether the simple VRE reinforcement learning algorithm permits
these Generators to learn to exercise this potential market power.
As detailed below in Sect. 4.3, the answer is a resounding “yes.” All five Generators
learn to implicitly collude on higher-than-true reported marginal costs. Moreover, the
marginal costs reported by Generators 3 and 5 typically are near or at the highest pos-
sible levels permitted by their action domains. Production and LMP solutions differ
dramatically from the production and LMP solutions obtained for the no-learning treat-
ment reported in Sect. 4.2. The result is a substantial increase in the total variable cost
of operation at the ISO-determined “optimal” Day-Ahead Market DC-OPF solution
for each hour of each day.
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Table 5 No-learning dynamic 5-node test case—solution values (SI) for real power production levels and
associated upper production limits, together with LMPs (nodal balance constraint multipliers) and minimum
total variable cost
Hour p∗G1 p∗G2 p∗G3 p∗G4 p∗G5 LMP1 LMP2 LMP3 LMP4 LMP5 minTVC
0 110.0 13.9 332.5 0.0 443.6 15.17 35.50 31.65 21.05 16.21 19587.1
1 110.0 13.4 269.4 0.0 437.5 15.16 33.95 30.39 20.60 16.13 17107.3
2 110.0 13.2 227.7 0.0 433.5 15.16 32.92 29.55 20.30 16.07 15556.8
3 110.0 13.0 206.7 0.0 431.5 15.16 32.40 29.13 20.15 16.04 14800.9
4 110.0 12.9 186.0 0.0 429.5 15.15 31.89 28.72 20.00 16.01 14076.1
5 110.0 13.0 196.3 0.0 430.5 15.16 32.15 28.93 20.07 16.03 14436.5
6 110.0 13.0 206.7 0.0 431.5 15.16 32.40 29.13 20.15 16.04 14800.9
7 110.0 13.3 248.8 0.0 435.6 15.16 33.44 29.97 20.45 16.10 16330.2
8 110.0 14.0 353.2 0.0 445.6 15.17 36.01 32.06 21.20 16.24 20433.9
9 110.0 14.6 437.0 0.0 453.6 15.18 38.08 33.74 21.81 16.35 24043.6
10 110.0 14.7 458.0 0.0 455.6 15.18 38.60 34.16 21.96 16.38 24993.9
11 110.0 14.8 468.4 0.0 456.6 15.18 38.85 34.37 22.03 16.39 25467.5
12 110.0 14.7 458.0 0.0 455.6 15.18 38.60 34.16 21.96 16.38 24993.9
13 110.0 14.6 437.0 0.0 453.6 15.18 38.08 33.74 21.81 16.35 24043.6
14 110.0 14.5 426.7 0.0 452.6 15.17 37.82 33.53 21.73 16.34 23583.1
15 110.0 14.5 426.7 0.0 452.6 15.17 37.82 33.53 21.73 16.34 23583.1
16 110.0 14.8 468.4 0.0 456.6 15.18 38.85 34.37 22.03 16.39 25467.5
17 2.1 0.0 520.0 108.9 522.6 14.02 78.24 66.07 32.61 17.32 31038.5
18 107.4 6.1 520.0 0.0 474.1 15.07 45.55 39.78 23.90 16.64 28006.9
19 110.0 15.1 510.1 0.0 460.6 15.18 39.88 35.20 22.33 16.45 27422.4
20 110.0 15.0 499.8 0.0 459.6 15.18 39.63 35.00 22.26 16.43 26931.9
21 110.0 14.9 478.7 0.0 457.6 15.18 39.11 34.57 22.11 16.41 25945.9
22 110.0 14.5 426.7 0.0 452.6 15.17 37.82 33.53 21.73 16.34 23583.1
23 110.0 14.1 363.9 0.0 446.6 15.17 36.28 32.28 21.28 16.25 20879.5
CapU1 Cap
U
2 Cap
U
3 Cap
U
4 Cap
U
5
110.0 100.0 520.0 200.0 600.0
4.2 Treatment 1: Generators Report True Supply Data
Suppose each Generator submits its true marginal cost function and true production
limits into the Day-Ahead Market. That is, suppose Generators do not report strategic
supply offers. In this case, the augmented DC-OPF problem solved by the ISO for
each hour H involves the minimization of true Generator total variable cost (subject
to a small voltage angle difference penalty) conditional on LSE loads, nodal balance
constraints, true Generator upper and lower production limits, and upper and lower
thermal limits on each branch of the transmission grid; compare Sect. 3.5.
Tables 4 and 5 report outcomes in standard (SI) units obtained for this dynamic
5-node test case by means of QuadProgJ invoked through DCOPFJ. These outcomes
include optimized solution values for real power branch flows, production levels,
LMPs (nodal balance constraint multipliers), and minimum total variable cost for 24
successive hours in the Day-Ahead Market.
These outcomes reveal that branch congestion occurs between node 1 and node 2
(and only these nodes) in each of the 24 h. This can be verified by examining column
P12 in Table 4, which shows that the real power flow P12 on branch km = 12 is
at its upper thermal limit (250 MWs) for each hour. The direct consequence of this
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Fig. 10 LMP separation and spiking in the MISO real-time market (Source: Midwest ISO, http://
www.midwestmarket.org/page/LMP%20Contour%20Map%20&%20Data)
branch congestion is the occurrence of widespread LMP separation, i.e., the LMP
values differ across all nodes for each hour. This can be verified by examining output
columns LMP1–LMP5 in Table 5.
Examining this LMP data more closely, it is seen that LMP2 and LMP3 (the LMPs
for nodes 2 and 3) exhibit a sharp change in hour 17, increasing between hour 16 and
hour 17 by about 100% and then dropping back to more normal levels in hour 18
and beyond. Interestingly, this type of sudden spiking in LMP values is also observed
empirically in MISO’s Dynamic LMP Contour Map for real-time market prices, which
is updated every five minutes; see, for example, Fig. 10.
The rather dramatic LMP spiking in hour 17 can be traced to several factors. First,
as seen in Fig. 9, the load profile for each LSE peaks at hour 17. Second, when solving
the DC-OPF problem to meet the high load in hour 17, the ISO has to take into
consideration the thermal limit constraining the flow of power on branch km = 12 as
well as the upper limit CapU constraining the production of Generator 3. Both of these
constraints turn out to be binding in hour 17. As seen in Table 4, the real power flow
in branch km = 12 is at its upper limit (250 MWs) for all 24 h. As seen in Table 5,
Generator 3 is dispatched in hour 17 at its upper production limit (520 MWs).
Given the configuration of the transmission grid, to meet the hour 17 peak load
the ISO is forced to back down (relative to hour 16) the less expensive production of
Generators 1 and 2 and to use instead the more expensive production of the “peaker”
Generator 4. After the peak hour 17, the load returns to lower levels. The ISO is
then able to schedule Generator 1 and Generator 2 at their more normal levels, with
Generator 1 at its upper production limit, and to avoid scheduling any production from
Generation 4; note from Table 3 that Generator 4’s minimum production level (CapL )
is 0. Furthermore, the LMPs drop back to their more normal levels after hour 17.
These illustrative 5-node test case outcomes for 24 successive hours in the Day-
Ahead Market raise intriguing economic issues concerning the operation of ISO-
managed wholesale power markets in the presence of inequality constraints on branch
flows and production levels. The strong sensitivity of the optimized LMP and real
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Table 6 Dynamic 5-node test case – action domain and learning input data
Action domain parameters
Gen ID M1 M2 M3 RIMaxL RIMaxU RIMinC SS
1 10 10 1 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.001
2 10 10 1 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.001
3 10 10 1 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.001
4 10 10 1 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.001
5 10 10 1 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.001
Learning parameters
Gen ID q(0) C r e
1 6000.0 1000.0 0.04 0.97
2 6000.0 1000.0 0.04 0.97
3 6000.0 1000.0 0.04 0.97
4 6000.0 1000.0 0.04 0.97
5 6000.0 1000.0 0.04 0.97
Initial seed values for all 20 runs
RunID InitialSeed RunID InitialSeed
01 695672061 11 −597305450
02 857398845 12 −494232424
03 507304343 13 −158932839
04 748974391 14 −934341230
05 494375928 15 −734837588
06 289658396 16 −219860821
07 158324732 17 −845925752
08 324702357 18 −367413463
09 903534301 19 −629523701
10 205753353 20 −257802760
power production values to changes in the set of binding (active) constraints is of
particular interest.
Equally intriguing, however, is whether the Generators might learn to make use of
the outcomes for any particular operating day D to change their reported supply offers
for day D+1 and beyond. The next section considers this issue.
4.3 Treatment 2: Generators Report Strategic Supply Offers
Now suppose, in contrast to Treatment 1, that the Generators do not necessarily report
their true marginal costs to the ISO for the Day-Ahead Market. Rather, using the VRE
stochastic reinforcement learning algorithm detailed in Sect. 3.6, with parameter values
as specified in Table 6, each profit-seeking Generator learns over time which marginal
cost function to report to the ISO based on the profits it has earned from previously
reported functions.
To control for random effects, outcomes for the learning treatment are reported
below in the form of mean and standard deviation values obtained for 20 runs using
the 20 different seed values reported in Table 6.24 Across all 20 runs, 422 simulated
24 Each Generator implements VRE learning by means of its own JReLM learning module, which must
be initialized with a seed value for its pseudo-random number generator. Each initial seed value reported
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Table 7 Learning dynamic 5-node test case—mean and standard deviation for solution value (SI) on day
422 for real power branch flow Pkm , with associated thermal limit PUkm , for each distinct branch km
Hour P12 P SD12 P14 P
SD
14 P15 P
SD
15 P23 P
SD
23 P34 P
SD
34 P45 P
SD
45
00 249.3 3.3 77.0 9.2 −116.5 10.4 −100.7 3.3 −120.3 9.6 −103.9 11.6
01 248.0 6.4 74.8 11.7 −113.2 13.9 −74.9 6.4 −130.8 13.1 −100.9 14.7
02 247.1 9.1 73.7 13.3 −111.3 16.7 −58.0 9.1 −137.3 16.2 −99.4 16.9
03 246.4 10.5 73.2 14.2 −110.3 18.3 −49.6 10.5 −140.1 17.8 −98.7 18.1
04 245.5 12.0 72.6 15.2 −108.9 20.1 −41.6 12.0 −142.8 19.5 −97.8 19.4
05 246.0 11.2 72.9 14.7 −109.6 19.2 −45.6 11.2 −141.5 18.6 −98.2 18.7
06 246.4 10.5 73.2 14.2 −110.3 18.3 −49.6 10.5 −140.1 17.8 −98.7 18.1
07 247.5 7.8 74.1 12.5 −112.1 15.3 −66.5 7.8 −134.1 14.7 −100.0 15.8
08 249.4 2.9 77.8 8.5 −117.3 9.5 −109.5 2.9 −116.5 8.7 −104.8 10.6
09 249.8 1.1 80.7 5.6 −120.6 5.9 −145.0 1.1 −101.0 5.7 −108.6 7.0
10 249.9 0.6 81.4 5.1 −121.4 5.2 −154.0 0.6 −97.1 5.1 −109.5 6.3
11 249.9 0.4 81.8 4.8 −121.9 4.9 −158.3 0.4 −95.1 4.9 −110.0 6.0
12 249.9 0.6 81.4 5.1 −121.4 5.2 −154.0 0.6 −97.1 5.1 −109.5 6.3
13 249.8 1.1 80.7 5.6 −120.6 5.9 −145.0 1.1 −101.0 5.7 −108.6 7.0
14 249.7 1.3 80.3 5.9 −120.2 6.3 −140.7 1.3 −102.9 6.1 −108.1 7.4
15 249.7 1.3 80.3 5.9 −120.2 6.3 −140.7 1.3 −102.9 6.1 −108.1 7.4
16 249.9 0.4 81.8 4.8 −121.9 4.9 −158.3 0.4 −95.1 4.9 −110.0 6.0
17 250.0 0.0 85.3 3.2 −125.5 3.2 −198.6 0.0 −77.0 3.3 −114.4 3.9
18 250.0 0.0 83.6 4.1 −123.8 4.1 −180.7 0.0 −85.2 4.2 −112.3 5.1
19 250.0 0.0 83.2 4.2 −123.4 4.2 −176.1 0.0 −87.3 4.3 −111.7 5.1
20 250.0 0.0 82.9 4.3 −123.0 4.3 −171.7 0.0 −89.3 4.4 −111.3 5.3
21 250.0 0.2 82.1 4.6 −122.3 4.6 −162.7 0.2 −93.2 4.7 −110.4 5.7
22 249.7 1.3 80.3 5.9 −120.2 6.3 −140.7 1.3 −102.9 6.1 −108.1 7.4
23 249.4 2.7 78.1 8.1 −117.7 9.0 −114.0 2.7 −114.5 8.3 −105.3 10.1
PU12 P
U
14 P
U
15 P
U
23 P
U
34 P
U
45
250.0 150.0 400.0 350.0 240.0 240.0
trading days was the maximum time it took for all five Generators to “converge”
to a sharply peaked choice probability distribution in which a probability of 0.999
was assigned to a single supply offer.25 Consequently, all learning outcomes reported
below are for day 422.
For simplicity, each Generator i selects supply offers from its action domain using
VRE reinforcement learning with commonly specified values for the four learning
parameters {q(0), C, r, e}; cf. Sect. 3.6. In addition, to ensure equal cardinalities and
similar densities, each Generator i’s action domain ADi is constructed using com-
monly specified values for the six action-domain parameters {M1, M2, M3, RIMaxL,
RIMaxU, SS}; cf. the discussion in Sect. 3.7. These parameter value specifications are
listed in Table 6.
Table 7 provides detailed numerical solution values (means and standard deviations)
for branch flows on day 422. Recalling that the thermal limit on branch km = 12 is
Footnote 24 continued
in Table 6 is used to generate five pseudo-random numbers, one for each Generator. Each of these numbers
is then used in turn as the initial seed value for the corresponding Generator’s JReLM learning module.
25 The mean convergence time across the 20 runs was actually only 62 simulated trading days with an
actual computing time of about 4.5 min.
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Table 8 Learning dynamic 5-node test case—means and standard deviations for solution values (SI) on
day 422 for real power production levels
Hour p∗G1 p∗SDG1 p∗G2 p∗SDG2 p∗G3 p∗SDG3 p∗G4 p∗SDG4 p∗G5 p∗SDG5
00 110.00 0.00 99.80 0.88 280.40 10.92 189.37 29.60 220.42 21.84
01 109.92 0.36 99.64 1.59 220.92 17.07 185.74 37.25 214.17 28.21
02 109.85 0.67 99.53 2.10 182.18 22.66 182.11 42.50 210.73 32.93
03 109.81 0.83 99.47 2.35 163.20 25.51 179.72 45.31 208.98 35.57
04 109.78 0.98 99.42 2.60 144.96 28.69 177.50 48.31 206.74 38.51
05 109.80 0.91 99.45 2.48 154.08 27.03 178.61 46.79 207.86 37.00
06 109.81 0.83 99.47 2.35 163.20 25.51 179.72 45.31 208.98 35.57
07 109.88 0.52 99.59 1.84 201.60 19.83 184.36 39.92 212.17 30.52
08 110.00 0.00 99.81 0.86 300.60 9.85 190.23 27.16 222.16 19.91
09 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.80 382.48 5.95 193.70 18.22 229.20 12.83
10 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.79 403.03 5.22 194.57 16.43 230.97 11.41
11 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.78 413.12 4.92 195.00 15.65 231.84 10.81
12 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.79 403.03 5.22 194.57 16.43 230.97 11.41
13 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.80 382.48 5.95 193.70 18.22 229.20 12.83
14 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.81 372.38 6.36 193.27 19.19 228.33 13.60
15 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.81 372.38 6.36 193.27 19.19 228.33 13.60
16 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.78 413.12 4.92 195.00 15.65 231.84 10.81
17 110.00 0.00 99.84 0.71 506.19 3.25 197.68 10.36 239.88 7.11
18 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.74 464.70 4.18 197.02 13.32 236.04 9.13
19 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.75 454.09 4.26 196.73 13.57 235.14 9.30
20 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.76 443.90 4.37 196.30 13.91 234.36 9.53
21 110.00 0.00 99.83 0.77 423.24 4.69 195.43 14.97 232.71 10.29
22 110.00 0.00 99.82 0.81 372.38 6.36 193.27 19.19 228.33 13.60
23 110.00 0.00 99.81 0.86 311.06 9.30 190.67 25.92 223.06 18.93
CapU1 Cap
U
2 Cap
U
3 Cap
U
4 Cap
U
5
110.0 100.0 520.0 200.0 600.0
250 MWs, note that congestion occurs on branch km = 12 in the peak hour 17 (and for
several hours thereafter) in all 20 runs. Moreover, although the mean flow on branch
km = 12 is slightly below the thermal limit in other hours, in fact this branch is
congested during all 24 h of day 422 in all but three of the 20 runs. Moreover, no other
branch is ever congested. These findings are similar to the no-learning treatment, in
which branch km = 12 (and only this branch) was found to be persistently congested.
Tables 8 and 9 provide detailed numerical solution values (means and standard
deviations) for real power production levels and LMPs, respectively, on day 422.
Table 10 gives the ordinate coefficient aR and slope coefficient bR for the (linear)
marginal cost function reported to the ISO on Day 422 by each of the five Generators
in each of the 20 runs. In the following discussion we highlight various aspects of
these outcomes that differ significantly from the corresponding outcomes presented
for the no-learning treatment in Sect. 4.2.
Figure 11 displays the (mean) solution values obtained for production for each of
the 24 h on day 422, along with the corresponding solution values obtained for day
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Table 9 Learning dynamic 5-node test case—means and standard deviations for solution values (SI) on
day 422 for LMPs (nodal balance constraint multipliers)
Hour LMP1 LMPSD1 LMP2 LMP
SD
2 LMP3 LMP
SD
3 LMP4 LMP
SD
4 LMP5 LMP
SD
5
00 52.74 12.33 110.30 58.16 99.39 48.02 69.40 21.56 55.70 13.06
01 52.70 12.26 100.56 49.61 91.49 41.16 66.56 19.44 55.16 12.82
02 52.68 12.23 94.18 44.34 86.32 36.92 64.69 18.12 54.81 12.67
03 52.66 12.22 91.02 41.79 83.75 34.86 63.77 17.46 54.63 12.60
04 52.63 12.23 87.96 39.38 81.27 32.90 62.86 16.84 54.45 12.54
05 52.65 12.23 89.49 40.57 82.51 33.86 63.32 17.15 54.54 12.57
06 52.66 12.22 91.02 41.79 83.75 34.86 63.77 17.46 54.63 12.60
07 52.69 12.24 97.38 46.96 88.91 39.03 65.63 18.78 54.98 12.75
08 52.75 12.37 113.52 61.04 102.01 50.33 70.35 22.28 55.87 13.15
09 52.79 12.56 126.59 73.16 112.61 60.05 74.15 25.31 56.58 13.52
10 52.80 12.62 129.87 76.28 115.27 62.55 75.11 26.09 56.75 13.61
11 52.80 12.65 131.48 77.83 116.57 63.79 75.58 26.48 56.84 13.66
12 52.80 12.62 129.87 76.28 115.27 62.55 75.11 26.09 56.75 13.61
13 52.79 12.56 126.59 73.16 112.61 60.05 74.15 25.31 56.58 13.52
14 52.78 12.53 124.98 71.64 111.30 58.83 73.68 24.93 56.49 13.47
15 52.78 12.53 124.98 71.64 111.30 58.83 73.68 24.93 56.49 13.47
16 52.80 12.65 131.48 77.83 116.57 63.79 75.58 26.48 56.84 13.66
17 52.73 12.81 147.26 92.89 129.34 75.90 80.10 30.38 57.58 14.07
18 52.80 12.81 139.68 85.72 123.22 70.13 77.95 28.50 57.26 13.93
19 52.80 12.78 138.00 84.10 121.86 68.83 77.46 28.08 57.17 13.87
20 52.80 12.75 136.38 82.54 120.55 67.58 77.00 27.68 57.09 13.82
21 52.81 12.68 133.09 79.38 117.88 65.04 76.05 26.87 56.93 13.71
22 52.78 12.53 124.98 71.64 111.30 58.83 73.68 24.93 56.49 13.47
23 52.76 12.39 115.19 62.56 103.36 51.54 70.83 22.66 55.96 13.19
422 in the absence of Generator learning.26 In the no-learning treatment, note that
the “peaker” (high cost) Generator 4 is only dispatched to produce energy at the peak
load hour 17. In the learning treatment, however, Generator 4 is able to use strategic
supply offers to ensure it is dispatched at approximately its upper production limit
(200 MWs) throughout each hour of the day. Also, in the no-learning treatment the
“cheap” Generator 5 is regularly dispatched at a high production level during each hour
of the day, but in the learning treatment it is backed way down because its strategic
supply offers make it appear to be a relatively more expensive Generator.
This heavier reliance on costlier generation in the learning treatment substantially
increases the total variable cost of operation. Indeed, as seen in Fig. 12, the minimum
total variable cost of operation under the learning treatment is roughly three times
higher than under the no-learning treatment.
Figure 13 graphically depicts the 24-h (mean) LMP solution values for the learning
treatment along with the 24-h LMP solution values for the no-learning treatment.
Interestingly, although the LMPs for the learning treatment are considerably higher
than the LMPs for the no-learning treatment, they are also less volatile around the peak
load hour 17. Consequently, the ISO is not able to use the appearance of price spikes
26 Given the stationarity of the daily load profiles and the Generators’ cost functions and production limits,
and the absence of system disturbances, in the no-learning treatment the 24-h outcomes obtained for any
one day are the same as for any other day.
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Table 10 Learning dynamic 5-node test case—ordinate coefficients (ar ) and slope coefficients (br ) for
the linear marginal cost functions reported to the ISO by the five generators on day 422 in each of the 20
runs, with summary statistics
Run a R1 b
R
1 a
R
2 b
R
2 a
R
3 b
R
3 a
R
4 b
R
4 a
R
5 b
R
5
1 21.0 0.031824 18.0 0.000005 75.0 0.036059 36.0 0.090005 40.0 0.033335
2 24.0 0.036370 25.7 0.011694 100.0 0.288465 32.7 0.067325 40.0 0.100003
3 24.0 0.036370 18.0 0.126012 75.0 0.100964 30.0 0.273000 40.0 0.066669
4 42.0 0.017360 15.0 0.063857 100.0 0.019232 72.0 0.000003 40.0 0.023811
5 18.7 0.060614 16.4 0.027279 37.5 0.072118 45.0 0.000002 30.0 0.025002
6 33.6 0.013889 25.7 0.011694 75.0 0.036059 32.7 0.048682 40.0 0.006668
7 15.3 0.013890 45.0 0.020460 25.0 0.112115 36.0 0.030003 40.0 0.033335
8 24.0 0.054552 16.4 0.027279 42.9 0.082420 60.0 0.000002 30.0 0.075003
9 14.0 0.054026 22.5 0.010233 100.0 0.096156 32.7 0.048682 30.0 0.050002
10 15.3 0.069431 16.4 0.081828 75.0 0.024040 40.0 0.020003 40.0 0.100003
11 16.8 0.054553 22.5 0.056257 37.5 0.072118 36.0 0.030003 40.0 0.000001
12 42.0 0.095461 30.0 0.000005 60.0 0.028848 51.4 0.025717 40.0 0.066669
13 16.8 0.038189 16.4 0.114557 75.0 0.024040 32.7 0.005182 30.0 0.035002
14 14.0 0.054026 20.0 0.000005 75.0 0.144234 60.0 0.000002 30.0 0.075003
15 24.0 0.009922 16.4 0.016370 30.0 0.039231 36.0 0.018003 40.0 0.006668
16 28.0 0.090917 16.4 0.114557 42.9 0.041211 36.0 0.000002 30.0 0.050002
17 21.0 0.095464 15.0 0.168000 37.5 0.018030 40.0 0.009094 40.0 0.016668
18 21.0 0.047734 16.4 0.016370 37.5 0.018030 40.0 0.020003 30.0 0.050002
19 14.0 0.011240 16.4 0.027279 75.0 0.024040 30.0 0.029400 40.0 0.033335
20 24.0 0.109100 15.0 0.006000 100.0 0.000001 45.0 0.037503 30.0 0.050002
Mean 22.7 0.049747 20.2 0.044987 63.8 0.063871 41.2 0.037631 36.0 0.044859
SD 8.4 0.030342 7.2 0.049954 25.6 0.065315 11.4 0.060501 5.0 0.029031
Min 14.0 0.009922 15.0 0.000005 25.0 0.000001 30.0 0.000002 30.0 0.000001
Max 42.0 0.109100 45.0 0.168000 100.0 0.288465 72.0 0.273000 40.0 0.100003
in peak load hours to detect the considerable exercise of market power by the learning
Generators. Rather, some form of direct auditing of the Generators’ cost attributes
would seem to be required.
Figure 14 displays the (mean) marginal cost functions that the five Generators
report to the ISO on day 422, along with their true marginal cost functions. Despite
the absence of any explicit collusion, all five Generators have learned to report higher-
than-true marginal cost functions with respect to both ordinate and slope. In the case
of Generators 3 and 5, the two largest generating units, the increase is substantial;
these two Generators quickly learn to report a marginal cost function that is near or
at the highest level permitted in their action domains.27 Clearly the core aspects of
the WPMP market design currently captured in the AMES framework do not provide
sufficient mechanisms to prevent Generators from exercising substantial market power
through strategic reporting of supply offers.
These findings can be compared with the findings of Wolfram (1999), who deter-
mined empirically that the (pre-NETA) uniform-price auction design in effect for the
UK wholesale power market at the time of her study provided incentives for generators
27 More precisely, the lower and upper range-index values implied by these Generators’ reported marginal
cost curves typically converge with rapidity to values that are near or at their highest permitted range-index
levels RIMaxL = 0.75 and RIMaxU = 0.75; cf. Table 6.
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Fig. 11 Dynamic 5-node test case solution values for 24-h real power production levels (day 422)—
generator learning compared with no learning
to raise prices above costs. In addition, Mount (2000) uses a simple analytical
framework to show how generators facing normally-distributed demand in a who-
lesale power market operated as a uniform-price auction have an incentive to submit
supply offers that far exceed their true costs. The AMES Day-Ahead Market collapses
to a uniform-price auction only in the absence of transmission congestion; LMP
separation occurs when any branch is congested. However, using simple reinforce-
ment learning with no explicit collusion, the AMES Generators quickly co-learn how
to submit supply offers that result in substantial market power whether or not LMP
separation occurs.
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Fig. 12 Dynamic 5-node test case solution values for 24-h minimum total variable cost (day 422)—
generator learning compared with no learning
5 Concluding Remarks
The North American power transmission grid has been called “the largest and most
complex machine in the world” (Amin 2004, p. 31). An extraordinary experiment
is under way to see whether the physical operation of this complex machine can be
successfully married with a restructured commercial architecture encouraging increa-
sed reliance on demand and supply forces. Smart electrical devices permitting more
distributed physical control of the grid are being introduced along with market
designs permitting more decentralized pricing and allocation mechanisms, a trend
one commentator has called “electricity’s third great revolution” (Mazza 2003).
Stakeholders, policy makers, and researchers all clearly recognize the critical need
for this experiment to succeed (FERC 2007). Nevertheless, the issues raised by this
experiment are extremely challenging. How to analyze the potential dynamic perfor-
mance of a system comprising multiple distributed entities, some physical and some
human, all with finite information and computational capabilities? How to properly
take into account the stability limits of physical components as well as the strategic
behaviors of human participants responding to the incentives deliberately or inadver-
tently presented by system design features?
Agent-based modeling tools have been specifically developed to handle these types
of complexities, hence it is not surprising to find agent-based researchers actively invol-
ved in this electricity restructuring movement. As detailed by Davidson and McArthur
(2005) and by Widergren et al. (2006), multi-agent systems are attracting significant
research interest for power system applications. Indeed, the IEEE Working Group on
Multi-Agent Systems in Power Engineering is charged with exploring the benefits, ap-
plications, and advanced functionality that can be provided for power systems through
agent technology. The members of this IEEE MAS Working Group include economists
as well as engineers, and academics as well as industry stakeholders.
In this study we explore the potential usefulness of agent-based tools for investigating
the efficiency and reliability of the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP), a
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Fig. 13 Dynamic 5-node test case solution values for 24-h LMPs (day 422)—generator learning compared
with no learning
market design proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for com-
mon adoption by all U.S. wholesale power markets (FERC 2003). We first describe a
newly developed agent-based computational laboratory—the AMES framework—that
models a wholesale power market operating in accordance with core WPMP features
over a realistically rendered transmission grid subject to congestion effects. Using a
dynamic 5-node test case for concrete illustration, we then explore the extent to which
these core WPMP features permit and even encourage the exercise of market power
by Generators through strategic reporting of supply offers.
More precisely, in the dynamic 5-node test case the AMES ISO does not know
the AMES Generators’ true cost attributes. Rather, in each operating day D, the
AMES ISO must formulate its DC-OPF problem for each hour of the Day-Ahead
Market for day D + 1 based on the cost attributes reported to it by the Generators. The
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Fig. 14 Dynamic 5-node test case—mean reported marginal cost function versus true marginal cost function
for each generator (Day 422)
profit-seeking Generators learn over time what cost attributes to report to the ISO
using a simple reinforcement learning algorithm based on past profit outcomes.
As seen in Sect. 4, in a typical run the Generators converge within 62 simulated
trading days to supply offer selections for which their reported marginal cost functions
are uniformly higher than their true marginal cost functions, in some cases substantially
higher, despite the absence of any explicit collusion. The resulting “optimal” DC-OPF
solutions determined by the AMES ISO appear to have desirable properties, e.g., low
LMP volatility during peak load hours and congestion on only one branch. In fact,
however, total variable costs of operation are roughly three times higher than they
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would have been had the Generators reported their true cost attributes. As captured
in the current AMES framework, the core WPMP design features do not prevent the
considerable exercise of market power by Generators.
As detailed in Sect. 2, the AMES framework needs to be further extended to in-
corporate additional key aspects of the WPMP design that could significantly impact
the efficiency and reliability of market operations. Moreover, initial conditions and
parameter specifications need to be more carefully calibrated to match real-world
conditions. Nevertheless, we believe the preliminary findings reported in this study
suggest the great potential of agent-based computational models to help ensure a
successful restructuring of the electric power industry through intensive sensitivity
experiments.
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